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A near-consensus in American law reviews maintains that
American courts offer a good forum to hold business enterprises,
especially those that have headquarters in the United States, responsible
for numerous wrongful acts that injure persons and environments
located outside of this country.' The near-consensus is not unanimous.
Dissenters, however, acknowledge that they are challenging a strong
"proposition" or "position."2 Much of the literature focuses on
international human rights. From this central point of agreement,
writers diverge a bit. Most want to use the provision of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 (the Alien Tort statute) that bestows original jurisdiction on
the federal courts to hear aliens' claims for "a tort only, committed in
Sam Nunn Professor of Law, Emory University. Because Charlene Smith was so well-focused,
Tony Weir and Gary Schwartz so supportive, and the intellectual ambiance at Washburn so lively, I
found the Ahrens symposium instructive and enjoyable; my thanks to the entire Topeka team. Tony
Weir and my Emory colleagues Johan van der Vyver and David Bederman provided guidance on
international human rights law, but are not responsible for what I learned or failed to learn. Thanks
also to Sean Lowe and Aly Morin for research assistance.
1. A representative slice of the literature was published in just one calendar year. See John
Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 463, 500 (2000) (recommending, among other measures, the enactment of
new federal legislation); Richard L. Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act: A Practical Assessment, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 545 (2000) (offering guidance for litigators);
Peggy Rodgers Kalas, The Implications of Jota v. Texaco and the Accountability of Transnational
Corporations, 12 PACE INT'L L. REV. 47, 77 (2000) (concluding that adjudication in the United States
"is the only tool available at present ... to provide at least some type of remedy to victims, and prod
multinational actors into responsive actions."); Scott Holwick, Note, Transnational Corporate
Behavior and Its Disparate and Unjust Effects on the Indigenous Cultures and the Environment of
Developing Nations, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 183 (2000) (encouraging more litigation to
assert a human right to a satisfying environment); Douglas S. Morrin, Book Review, People Before
Profits: Pursuing Corporate Accountability for Labor Rights Violations Abroad Through the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 427 (2000) (urging an expansive view of subject-matter
jurisdiction).
2. See, e.g., M.O. Chibundu, Making Customary Law Through Municipal Adjudications: A
Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1069, 1093-1101 (1999) (critiquing "the Filartiga Proposition,"
which expands jurisdiction to hear claims alleging injury from violations of customary international
law); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law:
A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997).
3. The most famous attempt to seek redress in the United States for an offshore accident, the
Bhopal litigation, was structured as a personal injury/wrongful death case rather than a human rights
claim. See In Re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December 1984, 634 F.
Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). "Bhopal" is thought of as an accident that could have happened almost
anywhere-rather than an affront to indigenous people or a threat to human rights, such as a right to
culture and a safe environment. It is the latter type of claim that occupies this Essay.
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violation of the law of nations;"4 some downplay this legislation. Some
favor modest expansions, whereas some want to bestow justice sans
frontieres on the entire world. For many writers, the great evil abroad is
the face-to-face brutality-torture, summary execution, slave labor-that
business enterprises have reputedly encouraged or condoned. Other
commentators focus-as will I in this Essay-on harms to the
environment, especially those occasioned by resource extraction.
Although the writings contain divergences, writers of the literature
are not an especially diverse lot. Most of the American legal scholarship
on this topic comes from students, with a few practicing lawyers
contributing; almost all get published in student-edited journals
6
specializing in international, transnational, or comparative law.
Because the authors are relatively new to publishing, they do not fall
neatly into the specialist categories that describe law professors; but to
the extent these writings can be associated with a particular academic
specialty, that specialty is international law.'
In this Essay, I argue that international or transnational law is not
the only specialty with something to say about offshore wrongs. Coming
to the literature from a different field-a discipline whose perspective
should have been weighing in, but has so far contributed little to the
discussion-I know I sound like one of John Godfrey Saxe's famous blind
men of India who think they can apprehend the nature of an elephant
by using their hands.8  To some of us, the offshore-harms elephant is
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). Contemporary writers speak of "the Alien Tort Claims Act," or
"ATCA," the latter being something of an anachronism; eighteenth-century legislators did not
identify their laws using New Deal-style alphabetics. Some writers use Alien Tort Statute. Because
the words "alien" and "tort" appear in the statute, my editorial choice is to capitalize those words
and leave the rest of the name uncapitalized.
5. Writers who are uninterested in the Alien Tort statute typically focus on courts outside the
United States, such as an "international corporate dispute settlement court," see, e.g., Sadhir K.
Chopra, Multinational Corporations in the Aftermath of Bhopal: The Meld for a New Comprehensive
Global Regime for Transnational Corporate Activity, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 235, 239 (1994), while
agreeing that United States courts offer a good venue in the meantime. See id. at 249; see also John
Lee, The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a Healthy Environment
as a Principle of Customary International Law, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 283, 292-93 & n.28 (2000)
(noting litigation pending in the United States in search of "a reliable remedy.").
6. Academics who specialize in international law appear less inclined than students or
practitioners to favor expansive or liberal conceptions of jurisdiction. See supra note 1 (noting views
of Professors Chibundu, Bradley, and Goldsmith). For expressions of the expansive view by
academic lawyers, see Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 AM J. INT'L L. 461 (1989); Anthony D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell
Lawyers?, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985).
7. Following guidance from John Barrett, in this Essay I use "international law" loosely,
generally including the law of relations between states and the law of "interactions between private
citizens of different states or between a state and citizens of a different state," as well as other related
subdivisions in the field. John A. Barrett, Jr., International Legal Education in the United States:
Being Educated for Domestic Practice While Living in a Global Society, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 975,977-78 (1997).
8. The man who has touched the tail likens the elephant to a rope, while the one who has
touched the side proclaims, "God bless me! but the Elephant/Is very like a wall," and so on. John
Godfrey Saxe, The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Hindoo Fable, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN
GODFREY SAXE 111 (1892).
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Torts.9  Summary execution? One might call it wrongful death.
Torture? Battery, outrage, intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Pollution around Indonesian mines or Ecuadorian fields? Nuisance,
maybe trespass, maybe strict liability. You say slave labor, I say false
imprisonment. When you mention treaty violations, I think of
negligence per se.10
Seen through this Torts lens, the venerable concept called
"enterprise liability" can describe one category of offshore injuries:
accidental harms to groups of persons and their environments caused by
entrepreneurial activity. Such claims have been prosecuted in the
United States on behalf of foreign plaintiffs. A subset of these lawsuits
allege that the actions of the corporate defendants violated the
plaintiffs' human rights. Two paradigmatic cases are Jota v. Texaco,
Inc., still pending as of this writing, against Texaco for environmental
damage to the Oriente region in Ecuador," and Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoran, a claim alleging that Louisiana-based Freeport-McMoran
violated the Amungme habitat in Indonesia.13 In both Jota and Beanal,
the plaintiffs contended that their rights with respect to environment
and culture were "specific, universal, and obligatory" enough to
constitute binding international law, and that their claims against private
9. Examples of this small corpus of literature include Derek Brown, Comment, Litigating the
Holocaust: A Consistent Theory in Tort for the Private Enforcement of Human Rights Violations, 27
PEPP. L. REV. 553, 581-82 (2000) (proposing a new tort of "private human rights reparations.");
Adam Karp, Note, Genitorts in the Global Context: Female Genital Mutilation as a Tort Under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, the Torture Victim Protection Act, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Ac
18 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 315, 317-21 (1997) (analyzing female genital mutilation in a torts
perspective).
10. As one commentator has detailed, many offshore wrongs recognized as tortious conduct in
the United States have been deemed outside the scope of Alien Tort jurisdiction because they do not
affront an international consensus. See Morrin, supra note 1, at 432 (citing cases where American
courts refused to hear claims of offshore fraud, conversion, negligence, wrongful death, and
defamation). See also id. at 435 ("To date, only piracy, slave trade, genocide, war crimes, and attacks
on or hijacking of aircraft have been considered undisputed violations of universal co ncern.").
11. The phrase "enterprise liability" means different things to different writers, although all
seem to think of it as applying to accidents rather than intentional harms. George Priest, author of a
noted article on the subject, defines enterprise liability as a theory "that business enterprises ought to
be responsible for losses resulting from products they introduce into commerce." George L. Priest,
The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern
Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 463 (1985). Although scholarly treatments of enterprise liability
overlap with studies of the harms caused by mass-marketed products, see generally Roger J. Traynor,
The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN L. REV. 363, 376 (1965)
(noting that products liability presents a potential "wealth of analogy."), there is no necessary
connection between products liability and enterprise liability. One important founder of enterprise
liability, Albert Ehrenzweig, specifically went beyond the products liability antecedents proposed by
his contemporaries Fleming James and Roger Traynor, advocating liability for business activities
generally, not just for the marketing of products that cause injury. See Albert Ehrenzweig,
Negligence Without Fault, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1422, 1457 (1966). On the seminal nature of this work, see
Priest, supra, at 463 n. 10 (citing to Ehrenzweig in defining the term enterprise liability). Virginia
Nolan and Edmund Ursin go so far as to argue that strict products liability has been the wrong place
for an enterprise liability experiment. To Nolan and Ursin, business premises (supermarkets,
restaurants, department stores) offer a better venue. See VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN,
UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 168-69 (1995).
12. 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
13. 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
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defendants were not barred by a state action requirement.14  Jota and
Beanal are central to the paradigm because they conjoin the two
elements: by alleging that the defendant violated customary
international law, they invoke international human rights law; and by
accusing business-enterprise defendants of having caused accidental
harm, 5 they invoke enterprise liability.16
Although international human rights law and enterprise liability
are very separate spheres in the academy, they share terrain in common.
Enterprise liability endorses the idea of accident law as public law-with
the word "public" signifying systemic, aggregative, comprehensive, and
inclined to focus more on societal consequences than on individual
redress. Although this premise has divided the Torts community,
alienating some scholars who prefer to think of Torts in terms ofS 17
reparation or correction, it also suggests bases for alliance as well as
estrangement. The idea of tort law as public law 18 implies common
ground with a more literal kind of public law: the developing
international law of personal and environmental injury. For this
purpose, the Alien Tort statute stands for a critical conjunction: it has
been read as allowing persons who live outside the United States to
bring enterprise liability actions in American courts for injuries caused
by tortious conduct in violation of customary international law.
Bringing the two domains together in the sense of offering
remedies in American courts to individuals and environments like those
described in Jota and Beanal remains a distant prospect, and several
judges and commentators would apparently prefer to delay this
conjunction indefinitely. From my own vantage point outside the
14. See generally Herz, supra note 1, at 556-58 (discussing the "specific, universal, and
obligatory" requirement); id. at 559-62 (discussing the state action requirement). Regarding state
action, plaintiffs who sue private defendants using the Alien Tort statute must prove either "that the
norm at issue does not require state action or that the defendant [corporation] ... is a state actor" by
virtue of its relationship with government. Id. at 559-61.
15. Some readers may disagree with the characterization of the harm as accidental, in part
because conventions of human-rights litigation encourage plaintiffs to describe defendants' behavior
as outrageous. I use the word to distinguish the environmental-despoliation cases from cases
involving direct, intentional brutality; I am assuming that Texaco inflicted injuries in Ecuador
incidentally to drilling oil, and Freeport-McMoran desecrated land in Indonesia incidentally to
mining copper and gold. This division between accidental and intentional harms does not work well
in other contexts-notably the human rights claims against foreign oil companies for harms in Nigeria,
which contained allegations of both environmental despoliation and deliberate brutalities that
included extrajudicial execution. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL:
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA'S OIL PRODUCING
COMMUNITIES (1999).
16. Other commentators also regard these two cases as paradigmatic. See Herz, supra note 1, at
547-49; Hari M. Osofsky, Environmental Human Rights Under the Alien Tort Statute: Redress for
Indigenous Victims of Multinational Corporations, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 335, 337-38
(1997). In this Essay, I use "customary international law" as a modern-day synonym for the Alien
Tort statute's "law of nations." See Osofsky, supra, at 339.
17. The division is laid out in Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114
HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001).
18. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984).
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community of international law scholars, I am not entirely convinced
that American municipal courts are the best (or even a good) place to
adjudicate international human rights claims made by such persons asS . 19
the Amungme of Indonesia, or Ecuadorians of the Amazon interior.
Nor do I wish to assert that litigation is the best (or even a good) way to
deal with the problem of corporate despoliation of environments around
the world.2° Given my uncertainty, the thesis of this Essay is more
predictive than normative: despite occasional reversals and a slow pace
of change, I argue, various indicators suggest that enterprise liability will
in future years come together with international human rights law in
American courts, probably (but not exclusively) via the Alien Tort
statute, serving as vehicle to provide a human-rights based remedy for
21
accidents that injure persons and environments.
Evidence to support the thesis is less than conclusive, but strongly
suggestive. I present it in three succeeding parts. Part I explores the
phenomenon of global reckoning in the United States, by which I mean
a growing sense that boundaries of the nation-state do not delimit the
beginning or the end of legal and political responsibility for
geographically distant events. Part II surveys offshore-harms litigation
22in American courts decided after Filartiga v. Pefha-Irala, the judicial
decision that opened a wide new avenue of redress for plaintiffs under
the Alien Tort statute. Many offshore-harms plaintiffs have lost in the
courts since then, and the rejectionist doctrine of forum non conveniens
may be growing stronger rather than weaker, but indicators point
toward a more open reception for future litigation. Moving to a more
theoretical plane, Part III examines enterprise liability and international
human rights law as doctrines that can each encourage the other toward
liberal acceptance of new claims. This Part emphatically does not deny
19. Compare Chibundu, supra note 1, at 1072-73 (worrying about "the consequences to
international law of using domestic institutions to generate and contour it") with Herz, supra note 1,
at 551 (arguing that customary international law is broader and more generous to plaintiffs than is
commonly believed).
20. One scholar states the anti-litigation position in strong terms:
Litigation only addresses the race to the bottom concern indirectly, at best, through
whatever cumulative impact judgments against particular defendants might inspire. It
largely fails as preventative. It does not offer much promise of cooperative solutions to
race to the bottom issues, which generally require governmental participation. And even if
such litigation could constitute deterrence, it is too imprecise to be of much value.
Environmental ... protection requires the specificity of legislation and regulations, much of
it technical, or process oriented, as demonstrated by the nature of the domestic regulatory
regimes.
Jack I. Garvey, A New Evolution for Fast-Tracking Trade Agreements: Managing Environmental and
Labor Standards Through Extraterritorial Regulation, 5 UCLA J. INT'L & FOREIGN. AFF. 1, 32
(2000).
21. International-law scholars posit a tendency toward meliorism in the area of international
human rights. See generally Thomas Buergenthal, The Human Rights Revolution, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 205 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994) ("[W]hen you are tempted to
despair.., try to remember what has been achieved in a few short decades.").
22. 630 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1980).
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the force of counter-tendencies, among them political hostility in the
United States toward personal-injury claims, but seeks instead to
identify commonalities shared by these two apparently disparate
subjects. Part IV identifies a growing inclination among key personnel
in the United States-judges and legal educators-to see their work-
domain as extending beyond national boundaries.
I. A CONSENSUS ABOUT GLOBAL RECKONING
"Globalization," still a newish word, is for many a term of
opprobrium. Activists describe a world ravaged by the imperatives of
capital set free from the nation-state. In this view, business enterprises
can disregard almost all constraints, most pertinently the labor and
environmental regulations that a rich country would favor, by moving
exploitative activities offshore. Leaders of poor nations tolerate this
despoiling presence in the hope of achieving economic gain: they
welcome jobs, or bribes, or large-scale construction projects, or other
consequences of foreign direct investment.23  Released from such
oppressions as taxation, wage demands, concern for the environment,
and indeed the rule of law-or so the pessimists argue-capital migrates to
where it can do the most harm and reap the greatest profit.24
This gloomy account of privilege, lawlessness, and ruination (an
account that in this Essay need be neither confirmed nor denied)
overlooks a complementary phenomenon. Along with globalization, I
• 25
contend, a notion of global reckoning has arisen. Like globalization,
the concept of global reckoning begins with the idea of a world made
26
smaller. Expansions of foreign investment, the growth of
communication technologies, and new interdependencies among the
financial markets all link divergent places together. Yet, whereas
hostility to globalization focuses on how these developments weaken
domestic laws and other forces of progress, the consensus about global
reckoning suggests that in a smaller world, there is-and ought to be-less
23. See generally RUSSELL MOKHIBER & ROBERT WEISSMAN, CORPORATE PREDATORS: THE
HUNT FOR MEGA-PROFITS AND THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY 68-70 (1999) (describing gaps in
bargaining power between multinational corporations and the governments of poor countries).
Environmental lawyer Peggy Kalas notes the less cynical motives for poor nations to welcome
foreign investment. See Kalas, supra note 1, at 65 (quoting United Nations reports that link foreign
investment with gains in the status of women, enhanced technology transfer, and improvements in
"social and economic development" generally).
24. See ROBERT GILPIN, THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 293 (2000) (summarizing
this view); Noam Chomsky, Power in the Global Arena, NEW LEFT REV. 3, 18-19 (1998). See also
DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? 2 (1997) (recommending a turn-away from
globalization and toward local communities).
25. Although the phenomenon has manifested itself all over the world, see infra notes 37,55, 71
(citing sources from Canada, Britain, and Singapore), my focus on global reckoning here emphasizes
American acceptances of the idea.




room to hide. Wrongdoers may try to race to the bottom, seeking weak
or vulnerable or corruptible national governments and populations to
exploit, but the locale in which they do business will no longer be exotic
or remote. Miscreants, victims, investors, consumers, regulators, and
billions of bystanders can no longer deny that they share a crowded
planet. What happens next is another story, of course: the consensus
about a need for global reckoning does not extend to a consensus about
how to achieve it." The shift is only in perspective.
Global reckoning is an ancient as well as a contemporary idea.
Eastern religions, for instance, have taught for millennia that
accountability is no less real for being removed in time and space.
Reincarnation as a religious tenet resembles global reckoning, as does
the notion of karma. To a more attenuated extent, all religions share
the theme of a reckoning that stretches beyond human frontiers. In the
modern, secular West, global reckoning has met with contrary thought,
particularly during the late fifteenth through the late twentieth
centuries. Expansions of science and technology, conquests in the New
World, and the rise of markets all started with an ideology of
limitlessness.' 9 Yet, even during those centuries of denial about the
price of entrepreneurial growth, Western voices of reckoning were
occasionally heard. Malthusian gloom about the relationship between
famine and population size, for example, declared that behaviors in the
present would generate adversity in the future.3 ° Karl Marx said that
capitalism would be the agent of its own destruction." The twentieth
century brought a great harvest of global reckoning: two world wars
with grievous and interconnected consequences; an "atomic age" that
decreed all of humanity to be in mortal peril; the awakening of a
worldwide environmental movement; and what one might call entire
sciences of reckoning, including the theory of relativity (which relates
27. International-finance lawyer Herbert Morais makes a similar point, describing "global
governance":
[F]or the first time in human history, we now have a truly global society, and we live in one
big global village .... This new phenomenon of globalization has created the need for
developing and implementing principles of good global governance. Global governance,
including global neighborhood values (such as respect for life, liberty, justice and equity,
mutual respect, caring and integrity) and a global civil ethic consists of rights and
responsibilities, the promotion of democracy and combating corruption, all of which could
be achieved without compromising traditional national sovereignty.
Herbert V. Morais, The Globalization of Human Rights Law and the Role of International Financial
Institutions in Promoting Human Rights, 33 G.W. INT'L L. REV. 71, 78 (2000).
28. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (noting that debate over the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment positioned two camps, both of which held views that could be fit into the
global-reckoning mode, in opposition to each other).
29. I elaborate in Anita Bernstein, Engendered by Technologies (forthcoming).
30. See Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, in AN ESSAY ON THE
PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION AND A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 59, 109-19
(Anthony Flew ed., 1985).
31. See Richard Ball, Individualism, Collectivism, and Economic Development, 573 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 57, 75-77 (2001) (summarizing "the self-destruction thesis").
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matter to energy, thereby asserting that space imposes consequences on
time, and vice versa) and chaos theory (featuring the famous "butterfly
effect," whereby experiences in the life of one butterfly can change
climates and waterways).3
How forceful is this claim about a tendency toward greater global
reckoning? Any reference to a consensus-and in this Essay I have made
two such references-contains a certain peril. Perhaps my claim is
wrong. Beliefs that the offshore world is remote (like those that helped
to construct a penal colony in Australia in the eighteenth century) may
still hold sway. Even if some consensus does exist, furthermore, the
details of that consensus remain somewhat fuzzy. Let us therefore see
what we can find about a broad-based sense that the fact of
globalization calls for global reckoning.
First, the theoretics. Scholarship in a variety of disciplines
describes an ever-closer integration of national economies, making the
movement toward reckoning inevitable. One might retort that certain
academic specialists make a career of proclaiming a perpetual increase
in world order: international economics, trade regulation, foreign
relations, and the like start with a certain a priori disbelief in
isolationism. Occupational bias cannot, however, explain the dramatic
increase in academic writing on international economic integration that
has followed the collapse of the Iron Curtain. After all, internationalists
have always been internationalists, inclined to see what their training
tells them; the concern for globalization that increased in the 1990s
marked a departure from the past.33
In a study of the future of government in the global economy, one
scholar envisions only two alternatives to untrammeled and disastrous
sprawls of neoliberal prerogative: either national governments will
reassert themselves, or transnational institutions will be devised to effect
regulation.34 This new institutionalization "means a trade regime that
puts labour and environmental rights on a par with property rights," he
continues. "It means a financial regulatory regime with global
standards, and an end to unregulated offshore havens."35 In this view,
transnational accountability ought to be installed as quickly as possible,
but it is not inevitable. An English theorist disagrees, deeming global
32. A casebook on international environmental law surveys these developments. See EDITH
BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 5-18 (1998).
33. It is hard to compose a footnote in support of my assertion that the literature on
globalization and related topics has grown voluminous in recent years, beginning approximately in
the mid-1990s. A sense of the topic's vastness, however, comes from the two sentences used to begin
an essay. See Jim Chen, Globalization and Its Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157, 158 (2000)
("Globalization marks the end of an epoch. Not merely an epoch in the colloquial sense, but an
epoch in the geological sense.").
34. See Robert Kuttner, The Role of Governments in the Global Economy, in GLOBAL
CAPITALISM 147,156-57 (Will Hutton & Anthony Giddens eds., 2000).
35. Id. at 158 (emphasis supplied).
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reckoning inevitable: "Companies will huff and puff, but in the end they
will not leave-or only a tiny handful will. Most big multinationals are
very anxious to be seen as good corporate citizens .... If you've got a
big trading presence here, it's no use trying to pretend you're offshore.
We will treat you as if you were resident in Britain.""
International institutions have manifested responses to this
perspective. Consider international trade regulation, for example.
From the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which focused
on the reduction of tariffs, quotas, and subsidies, the contemporary
international-trade regime has expanded to cover services, investment
measures, and intellectual property. States have lost a large share of
their power to veto the adverse decisions of dispute-settlement panels.
37
This wider conception of the term "trade" has created a vehicle of
reckoning.
Turmoil in Asian national economies during the 1990s, widely
perceived as a problem of international urgency," revived the idea of
global reckoning with respect to the international capital markets.
Global reckoning had been a cornerstone of the Bretton Woods
agreement of 1946, which installed international financial regulation;
around 1973 the Bretton Woods controls were greatly loosened,
liberalizing transnational investment. 39 Scholars attribute the financial
crisis in Asia that started in 1997 to a panicky stampede of capital away
40from vulnerable national economies. Many regulators now identify a
task of increased reckoning ahead. "The problem [of the Asian crisis] is
not regional, but international," according to the former chairman of the
Federal Reserve Bank.41  "And there is every indication that it is
systemic ... from within the ordinary workings of the international
financial system itself. '42 In this context, global reckoning emerges as a
response to free-flowing, often speculative or heedless, movements in
the national capital markets that can wreak severe havoc whenever
investors pull (or stampede) out.
The development banks, which have not distinguished themselves
as solvers of this problem of fleeing capital, have taken stands elsewhere
in behalf of accountability: although the International Monetary Fund
has drawn a large share of criticism for inaction and unwise
interventions in the Asian financial crisis,43 as a development bank it has
36. Id.
37. See Global Law Trends Changing Concept of State, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Jul. 12,
2000 (available on Westlaw) [hereinafter Global Law].
38. See Mark Weisbrot, Globalization for Whom?, 31 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 631, 645 (1998).
39. See id. at 641.
40. See id.
41. Paul A. Volcker, The Sea of Global Finance, in GLOBAL CAPITALISM, supra note 34, at 75,
77.
42. Id.
43. See Weisbrot, supra note 37, at 650 (summarizing criticisms and noting that in "a unique
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been a strong player in the movement toward global reckoning,
extending itself in the area of human rights and social policy. Because
the mandate of the IMF is to promote international monetary
cooperation, advance sound national macroeconomic policies, and
extend short-term financing to alleviate balance of payments problems,
the Fund does not have an obvious warrant to promote global reckoning
in a social or political sense. 44 Nevertheless, the IMF has interpreted its
Articles of Agreement, entered into in 1944, to give it authority in such
socioeconomic endeavors as combating corruption, reforming civil
service, promoting women's rights, and aiding families displaced or
burdened by IMF-funded projects." Other development banks, led by
the World Bank, have applied themselves forthrightly to promoting
international human rights. Rejecting the view that economic
development is separate and distinct from human rights development,
the World Bank finds a link between the two insofar as wealth is a
source of health.46  A newer international-finance institution, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),
announced at its formation that member states shared a commitment to
"multiparty democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and
market economics.,
47
Moving closer to the international entities at the center of this
Essay-business enterprises with headquarters in one country and risky
activities in another-we may now consider global reckoning as applied
to foreign direct investment, a phrase that Robert Gilpin has defined as
investment in "services, manufacturing, or commodity production" by a
firm "with partially or wholly owned subsidiaries within two or more
national economies., 48  Commentators agree that much needs to be
done: Gilpin, for instance, finds "the absence of international rules to
govern FDI ... remarkable. No rules exist comparable to those
affecting international trade and monetary affairs., 49 At the moment,
the consensus about global reckoning here appears limited to a
sentiment that more rules are needed, rather than a commitment to
living according to any particular code among those that have been
published: the Organization for Economic Development's guidelines on
breach of protocol," the chief economist of the World Bank reproached the IMF); Chomsky, supra
note 24, at 17.
44. See Morals, supra note 27, at 86-87 (noting gap between macroeconomic policymaking and
the well-being of individuals).
45. See id. at 89-90.
46. See Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, IMF and Human Rights, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 58 (1996).
47. Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, May 29,
art. 3, 1990 O.J. (L 372(3) 1,2). Morais adds that although this "commitment" imposes no binding
obligations, it at least moots the criticism that international financial institutions have no authority to
press for human rights or other social change. See id.
48. GILPIN, supra note 24, at 164.
49. Id. at 183.
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the subject of accidental injury attributable to foreign investment
(including directives to mitigate adverse effects on the environment) are
not binding, ° and the United Nations has been struggling, thus far
without success, to come up with a version of its Code of Conduct for
Transnational Corporations that member states would accept."
The OECD-sponsored Multinational Agreement on Investment
(MAI), first secretly negotiated in 1995 and aired in public starting in
1997 and 1998, sought to establish order in foreign direct investment by
12looking out for the prerogatives of investors. Debate over the
Agreement, which its enemies now appear to have won, has been a
dispute over what constitutes genuine global reckoning. Proponents of
the agreement spoke of "high standards for the liberalization" of
investment and a weapon against various kinds of irregularity,
particularly host-country discrimination against multinational
corporations. 3 Opponents retorted that MAI imposed only privileges
on multinational corporations and only obligations on "people and
governments."54 The apparent victory of the anti-MAI view supports a
conception of global reckoning that is contrary to the neo-liberal
concern for investors' prerogatives: this approach to global reckoning
regards investors as putative injurers who should not escape
accountability. A third-way alternative to the MAI/anti-MAI
dichotomy comes from Canadian trade negotiator Sylvia Ostry, who
focuses on the characteristics of an international investment regime that
would balance the interests of citizens and investors.55 Ostry identifies
several privileges and entitlements that multinational corporations
should receive, including a "right of establishment," which grants firms
the right to invest anywhere, and a principle of nondiscrimination
against foreign companies by the host government 6  She moderates
these MAI-like prescriptions by ceding to national governments the
50. See Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development: Clarification of
Environmental Concerns in OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 25 I. L. M. 494 (1986).
51. See Robert J. Fowler, International Environmental Standards for Transnational
Corporations, 25 ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (1995).
52. See Chomsky, supra note 24.
53. GILPIN, supra note 24, at 184.
54. Chomsky, supra note 24, at 26. Chomsky adds that the MAI introduces "standstill" and
"rollback:"
'Standstill' means that signers cannot introduce any legislation which interferes with
unrestricted corporate rights to do anything they feel like. 'Rollback' refers to the fact that
signers are obliged to roll back existing legislation that interferes with those rights. There is
a twenty-year lock so, once you get into it, you are stuck for twenty years. Of course, that
doesn't apply equally: if the US wants to get out of it, it will treat it like the Uruguay Round
when it decides to ban super-computers. But for the weaker people, it's a lock. Investors
are freed from even the most minimal obligations that might be imposed by some
democratic interference with private tyrannies.
Id. at 26-27.
55. See SYLVIA OSTRY, A NEW REGIMEFOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (1997), noted in
GILPIN, supra note 24, at 183.
56. Id.
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power to restrict or limit investment in certain sectors." These three
perspectives on the regulation of foreign direct investment, though very
divergent in their politics, share a concern with treating people and
institutions alike regardless of where they are located-a hallmark of
global reckoning.
So much for what elite experts think: evidence also suggests that
the consensus about global reckoning extends to those who have money
or other interests on the line. Consider the views of randomly surveyed
Americans, as gathered by the Program on International Policy
Attitudes (PIPA), a center associated with the University o f Maryland's
graduate schools of public affairs and international security studies.
PIPA undertook in 1999 to learn what Americans think about
globalization. The Program reviewed all previous poll results, held
focus groups around the United States, and conducted a new poll in
October 1999.18  The review identified support for globalization, a
concept left somewhat open-ended in the survey. Respondents
described globalization as tending to strengthen not only economic ties
but also cultural influence, institutional engagement, and values that are
"more oriented to a global context."'5 9
More directly pertinent to global reckoning, the survey respondents
consistently endorsed accountability while disapproving of measures
that truncate accountability, such as the "fast track" approach to trade
regulation that allows the executive branch to move rapidly ahead
60
without the delays of congressional debate. PIPA respondents
strongly supported greater attention to, if not outright protection of, the
needs of American labor.6' A large majority felt that products made in
violation of international labor standards ought to be barred from
importation. Respondents also endorsed trade sanctions while
disapproving of the World Trade Organization's portion that countries
should not be permitted to restrict importation of goods based on the
63
effects of production on the environment. PIPA also identified what
looks like empathy among Americans: a majority said that suffering
outside the United States is almost as important as suffering within the
nation; they also expressed willingness to pay higher prices for goods
not made in sweatshops, as well as for goods made and marketed in
61
compliance with American environmental laws.
57. Id.









The other sector that has money on the line is that portion of the
business community with a presence in both advanced and developing
nations: if the globalization critics are to be credited, this sector wants to
eat its multinational cake and have it too, profiting from operating
selectively in both rich and poor regions of the world. Again, the record
reveals acceptance of global reckoning. Although a "stakeholder" or
"social responsibility" view of corporate governance-the idea that
corporation managers should act with regard for a wide set of interests
and communities, rather than work merely toward wealth maximization
for shareholders-does not dominate the law, practice, or scholarshipS 65
concerning American business, a narrower proposition that offshore
wrongs are about as bad as domestic wrongs has emerged in the
transnational business community, according to an analysis published in
The Economist.66 Certainly, American companies do not yet operate in
foreign countries as if the Department of Labor and the EPA were
there with authority to sanction them. They do, however, experience
the glare of television news cameras and the Internet in such remote
locations as Nigeria and the North Sea. Consequently, most American
businesses with offshore operations at least pay lip service to the idea of
legal and ethical duties unbounded by national frontiers. They no
longer assert a general prerogative to operate as they please outside the
United States, as they may implicitly have done before the Bhopal
disaster of 1984.
In accepting the idea of global reckoning, both American survey
respondents and American businesses have not, to be sure, paid any
67
cash price up front. Conceding that national boundaries do not delimit
obligations has not stopped American corporate defendants from
making what are in effect contrary statements in litigation, such as
motions to dismiss on grounds related to jurisdiction or forum non
conveniens. My point here is to note a stance in principle, a posture that
endures even when affected entities try to wriggle out from its demands.
The remaining question about the phenomenon of global
reckoning concerns the role of law in its promotion. Some of the
increased force of law in advancing global reckoning has been blared in
newspaper headlines; it is hard to miss the formation of new tribunals,
including those for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia as well as the
emergent International Criminal Court, that assert jurisdiction over
65. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 442, 444 (2001) (noting solid rise of the shareholder over the stakeholder focus).
66. See Doing Well by Doing Good, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 22,2000, at 65.
67. The widely practiced research technique called "contingent valuation" finds empirical
validity in stated expressions about what something is worth, even though the person making the
statement has not in fact paid a price for what he or she purports to value. See generally Mark Sagoff,
At the Monument to General Meade, or On the Difference Between Beliefs and Benefits, 42 ARIz. L.
REV. 433 (2000) (reflecting on the validity of the technique).
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68individual perpetrators. Humanitarian intervention into foreign
nations has become almost commonplace. 69 At the same time, some of
the force of law as a force of global reckoning lies below the surface.
Some writers think that the law of global reckoning has only begun to
develop. For example, one commentator predicts that litigators will
soon be arguing "relevant international law issues" on behalf of
American citizens in American courts.70 Scholar-strategist Edward
Luttwak, writing from a base of admiration for markets, advocates "two
cheers for nasty lawyers" and "two more cheers for greedy lawyers" in a
chapter about the winners and losers of what he calls "turbo-
capitalism."'" According to Luttwak, private enterprise now whirls
through the world almost entirely unchecked.7" The American legal
system applies a unique, and necessary, brake on the engine:
It is the biggest corporations... that have gained most in wealth and
power from turbo-capitalism, not least through the opening of world
markets, and it is their power that needs to be tamed to preserve the
balance. When tempted to cut costs by cutting safety margins, their
executives remember liability claims and refrain; when contemplating a
high-handed imposition on suppliers or clients, they think of breach-of-
contract suits and step back; when attracted by other people's technology,
they recall what the jury did to the last big company accused of infringing
the patents of an inventive small company; when top executives calculate
how well they could do personally by manipulating the stock price just a
little, they also calculate what a lost shareholder suit could cost them,
even before the Securities and Exchange Commission gets into the act.
Famously greedy American lawyers ... thus serve a higher purpose after
all, by intimidating structurally greedy corporations.73
This view of civil litigation as a source of global reckoning regards
liability exposure as a crucial inhibitor of what would otherwise be
untrammeled corporate power. If Luttwak is correct on both of his
points-first, that "turbo-capitalism" is inflicting high-speed destruction
through the world and, second, that fear of litigation conduces to safer,
more prudent, and more lawful corporate choices-then the conjunction
of international human rights law with enterprise liability, or the
importation of foreign plaintiffs into American courts to allege injury in
violation of customary law, becomes a beneficent phenomenon. The
next Part examines the phenomenon in more detail.
68. See Global Law, supra note 37.
69. See id.
70. John A. Barrett, Jr., International Legal Education in U.S. Law Schools: Plenty of Offerings,
But Too Few Students, 31 INT'L L. 845, 849 (1997) [hereinafter Barrett, Plenty of Offerings].
71. EDWARD LuTTWAK, TURBO-CAPITALISM: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 7, 12 (1998).
72. See id.
73. Id. at 14-15.
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II. THE CONSENSUS GAINS INFLUENCE IN THE COURTS: OFFSHORE
HARMS AS TORTS ACTIONABLE IN THE UNITED STATES
Plaintiffs residing outside the United States who seek redress for
accidental injury occupy a simultaneously favored and disfavored
position in American courts. On the one hand, subject matter
jurisdiction is expansive and generous, at least in principle. State courts
have jurisdiction over common law claims brought against defendants
that do business inside the United States, no matter where plaintiffs
reside. Federal courts have jurisdiction based on diversity: plaintiffs
reside offshore; defendants reside in one state of the United States.
Even for cases where the plaintiff is located outside the United States,
and the injury occurred outside the United States, and the defendant
does not reside or do business inside the United States, the federal
district courts often have subject matter jurisdiction. According to the
Judiciary Act of 1789, "any civil action by an alien for a tort only
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States" may be heard in the federal courts.74 No other national legal
system in the world welcomes foreign litigants so openly.
On the other hand, plaintiffs' victories in practice have typically
been limited to surviving motions to dismiss. Acknowledging subject
matter jurisdiction, trial judges tend to shove offshore-harms litigation
against business enterprises out of their courtrooms. A supporter of
such litigation might conclude that generous jurisdictional provisions do
nothing more than tease potential claimants with a false hope of redress
in American courts.
Such a conclusion would be premature. Although American judges
have not yet conjoined international human rights law with enterprise
liability for accidents, in the last two decades they have taken several
key steps to create prospects for more liberal redress in the future.75
This Part surveys developments in American law that parallel the
consensus about global reckoning previously recounted.
A. Liberal Treatments of the Alien Tort Statute
This simply worded Alien Tort statute, a part of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, lacking an official name of its own, has long been shrouded in
74. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). The
original clause, written by Oliver Ellsworth, provided that the district courts "shall also have
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, or the circuit courts, as the case may be,
of all cases where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18
HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 445, 448 (1995). Congress went on to modify this language three
times; the current version dates back to 1948. See id. at 449.
75. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (noting "a growing
consensus" that the Alien Tort statute covers "'certain international common law torts."').
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mystery. Awakened from slumber in 1980 by activists who persuaded
the Second Circuit to apply it to human rights litigation, 77 the Alien Tort
statute continues to escape consensus about its meaning. Yet, although
Alien Tort claimants as a group have received very little by way of
remedy, post-1980 constructions of the statute have moved toward
favoring expansion of their rights and interests. 78  Consider several
junctures.
1. "A Tort Only."
Whatever the First Congress meant when it provided in 1789 for
jurisdiction over "tort" claims, we may confidently assume that it did
not intend the subject matter taught today under that rubric in
contemporary American law schools. Although the word is old, the
concept of Torts as a professional specialty or a division of the
curriculum did not arise until the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Moreover, "tort" is not the only obscure word in this phrase: why does
the statute add the adverb "only?" "I never could see," writes Joseph
Sweeney, "why granting jurisdiction over a 'tort' should be read as
implying a grant of jurisdiction over something other than a tort, this
creating a need to exclude the possibility." 79 He concludes that the
phrase "a tort only" must refer to the law of prize, and "tort only" must
have meant claims for reparation based on a capture that was otherwise
lawful.80  Despite Professor Sweeney's lengthy and learned review of
prize and admiralty case law, however, this originalist interpretation of
the Alien Tort statute has not carried the day. Other commentators,
whose works both preceded and followed Sweeney's article, have
insisted that the Alien Tort statute does not impose originalist
limitations on contemporary judicial interpretation.81 Current case law
reads the Alien Tort statute to permit actions alleging a wide array of
wrongs beyond prize, piracy, the infringement of ambassadors' rights,
and other perils of eighteenth-century international relations.
76. See liT v. Vensap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.) (referring to the
statute as "a kind of legal Lohengrin ... no one seems to know whence it came.").
77. See Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
78. But see Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law and Private Rights of Action, 1 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 421 (2000) (distinguishing among various types of Alien Tort litigation to suggest that the
trend toward expansion and liberalization may be narrower than it appears).
79. Sweeney, supra note 74, at 446.
80. See id.
81. See William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
"Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996) (replying to Sweeney); Burley, supra
note 6, at 464 (1989) (urging liberality in interpreting the statute); Kenneth C. Randall, Federal
Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 1, 28 (1985) (arguing that "a tort only" does not greatly affect federal jurisdiction over aliens'
claims).
One Alien Tort defendant tried to use the Sweeney article as a centerpiece of a petition for
rehearing-unsuccessfully, it turned out. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), reh'g
denied, 74 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1005 (1996).
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2. "The Law of Nations" and the Individual's Right to Sue.
Alien Tort case law contains one major exception to this consensus
about a broad mandate to effect global reckoning in American courts:
the 1986 decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
expressed in three concurring opinions, in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic.82  Tel-Oren, though currently repudiated and disfavored,
warrants attention for setting forth three separate paths to
nonjusticiability. Each of these paths has been cogently laid out, and
thus the rejection of all three alternatives shows that the emergent
liberal view of the Alien Tort statute has overcome several separate
obstacles.
Of the three Tel-Oren opinions, the concurrence by Robert Bork
has provoked the most law review commentary. 83 In Tel-Oren, Judge
Bork maintained that the Alien Tort statute was written to recognize
the three types of injuries that William Blackstone identified as
violations of the law of nations: piracy, violation of safe conducts, and
infringement of ambassadors' rights.84 This narrow framework having
been set in place, contemporary human-rights claimants have little
recourse under the statute. More fundamentally, Bork identified the
law of nations as having "no impact on individuals. Only a self-
executing treaty, or a rule of international law that itself provides for
enforcement by individuals, can give rise to a cause of action in courts of
the United States.,
85
As Anthony D'Amato has demonstrated, the notion that
international law imposes rights and duties only on states derives from
the government-focused jurisprudential views of the English positivist
Lassa Oppenheim and, before him, Jeremy Bentham, coiner of the
phrase "international law., 86 This perspective was explicitly revisionist
in its time, departing from more organic, norms-based "law of nations"
or jus gentium.87 Today the view of international law as applying only to
states has been drastically modified, so as no longer to obstruct the
88claims of individuals alleging violations of their human rights.
82. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
83. See D'Amato, supra note 6, at 92.
84. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 816 (Bork, J., concurring).
85. D'Amato, supra note 5, at 97.
86. See id. at 101-02. Lassa Oppenheim was hostile enough to individual human rights claims to
argue that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 imposed no legal obligations. See
Morais, supra note 27, at 72 (citing OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1001-05 (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts eds., 1992)).
87. See D'Amato, supra note 6, at 103.
88. See Bartram S. Brown, Nationality and Internationality in International Humanitarian Law,
34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 347 (1998) (deeming state-centered paradigm inadequate in the enforcement of
international human rights); Jennifer Moore, From Nation State to Failed State: International
Protection from Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Agents, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 81, 83
(1999) (attributing this move away from a state-focus to the rise of non-government forces that hold
government-like power: "death squads, paramilitary forces, insurgent armies, organized criminal
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Judge Harry Edwards, clearly uncomfortable with both expansive
and narrow readings of Alien Tort jurisdiction,8 tried to stake out a
centrist position that rejected the plaintiffs' claim. "I do not believe that
the law of nations, as presently developed and construed, holds
individuals responsible for most private acts," he wrote in his Tel-Oren
concurrence; "it follows logically that the law of nations provides no
substantive right to be free from the private acts of individuals, and
persons harmed by such acts have no right, under the law of nations, to
assert in federal court." 90 Judge Edwards did not define "private acts,"
although he did expound on the ambiguous status of "the individual"
within international law. 91 His seeking-the-center position later was
moved to the stringent end of the continuum upon the publication of
Kadic v. Karadzic, which permitted plaintiffs injured by soldiers in the
former Yugoslavia to sue in the United States under the Alien Tort
statute. The defendants in Kadic were similar to the Tel-Oren
defendants in that they fell into a middle category between state actors
and private citizens. This gray area, which Judge Edwards wanted to
deem outside the bounds of international law is, after Kadic, now
covered by a strong precedent to the contrary. 93
The third concurrence in Tel-Oren rejected the plaintiff's claims
using the political question doctrine. In this view, only "Congress and
the President" can apply, and decree compliance with, the law of
nations.94 Although Judge Robb devoted most of his opinion to
discussing the difficulty of adjudicating claims of international terrorism
in domestic courts, his proffered framework would be equally hostile to
accident claims. Almost any contemporary tort claim would collide with
Judge Robb's barrier,95 as he explained: "Tort law requires both
agreement on the action which constitutes the tort and the means by
which it can be determined who bears responsibility for the unlawful
injury... But international 'law,' or the absence thereof, renders even
entities, family-based political cliques, clans, [and] sub-clans."). As Dinah Shelton has pointed out,
even Oppenheim's treatise on international law manifested some retreat from a strict state-focus. See
Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial
Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611, 613 (1994) (comparing the 1912 edition, which had declared that
"States only and exclusively are subjects of the Law of Nations," to the 1955 edition, which noted that
events related to the two world wars had made that proposition no longer true).
89. Judge Edwards implored the Supreme Court to expound on Alien Tort jurisdiction, for the
benefit of litigants and lower-court judges. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 774, 775.
90. Id. at 779.
91. Id. at 792-94.
92. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
93. See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d 424, 444 (D.N.J. 1999) ("Kadic's recent
interpretation of international law in 1995 carries greater weight than the conflicting interpretations
of the three concurring opinions in Tel-Oren, which examined international law as it stood over
fifteen years ago.").
94. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 827.
95. See Klinghoffer v. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), as an exception. In
Klinghoffer the plaintiffs expressed their claim as piracy, a venerable violation of international law.
See id. at 860 (rejecting Judge Robb's approach). Piracy claims are rare today, however.
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the search for the least common denominator of civilized conduct in this
area, an impossible-to-accomplish judicial task. 96  Because intentional
harm has been more decisively condemned than accidents by "the law of
nations" in D'Amato's sense of the term-norms and shared
understandings about right and wrong-the Robb approach would reject
accident claims a fortiori, even if dealing with environmental
degradation is deemed less of a "political question" than dealing with
terrorism.
In sum, judges who wish to reject claims brought under the Alien
Tort statute have plenty of material about the limited meaning of the
statute to work with. Among other devices that would support a
rejectionist attitude," a well-researched originalist argument and three
separate concurring opinions from a prominent court offering
alternative paths to dismissal are available. Despite these bows in the
quiver, however, decisional law reveals a steady liberal interpretation
regarding the question of subject matter jurisdiction under the statute. 98
Tel-Oren has been spurned even in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, where decisional law from the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia is supposed to be binding
precedent, in favor of the more liberal approach stated in Kadic v.
Karadzic.9  Judges are regarding the Alien Tort statute as a basis for
global reckoning.
00
B. Liberalizing Portents Beyond the Alien Tort Statute
1. The Torture Victim Prevention Act.
When Congress enacted the Torture Vicdnli Prevention Act
(TVPA) in 1991,10 its legislative purpose was to reject the Tel-Oren
96. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823.
97. See infra Part lI.B. (describing uses of forum non conveniens) and Part IV (noting
conservative tendencies among the judiciary).
98. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo,
72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Alien Tort statute provides "both a private cause
of action and a federal forum."); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (mentioning
"genocide, war crimes, and official torture"); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1474-75 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding that the statute "creates a course of action for violations of specific, universal and
obligatory human rights standards."); Jama v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 22 F. Supp.2d
353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998) (allowing claim that alleged abuses in detention center); Xuncax v. Gramajo,
886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding "both a jurisdictional grant and a private right to sue
for tortious violations of international law."). As was mentioned above, these holdings in themselves
are far from victories for plaintiffs.
99. See Jane Doe I v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3,8 (D.D.C. 1998).
100. See generally The Enforcement of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law by Civil Suits in
Municipal Courts: The Civil Dimension of Universal Jurisdiction, in CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES: NEW FORMS, NEW APPLICATIONS 156, 158 (1997) (remarks of David
Bederman) ("The ground-work is being laid in US courts for the future refinement-and
enforcement-of international law obligations.").
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1997).
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decision. 102 In this statute, Congress not only wrote into statutory law
the Filartiga holding that federal courts have jurisdiction over aliens'
claims alleging torture under color of law outside the United States; it
also expanded Alien Tort remedies to cover United States citizens.l3
Passage of the TVPA stands for more than just redress against
torturers. A recent Alien Tort decision, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., declared that the TVPA expresses "a policy favoring
receptivity" of lawsuits alleging violations of the law of nations
105generally, not just torture. The court added that the TVPA has
"communicated a policy that such suits should not be facilely dismissed
on the assumption that the ostensibly foreign controversy is not our
business."' 0 6 It would be only a small step from Wiwa for judges to
regard the TVPA as encouraging litigation in the United States to
enforce a wide array of human rights, beyond freedom from torture.
2. The Forum Non Conveniens Glass Is Not Empty.
Many plaintiffs who suffer injuries offshore do not need the Alien
Tort statute in order to achieve jurisdiction over defendants: a foreign
plaintiff can sue in the United States (in either federal or state court)
using municipal tort law, if the defendant is sufficiently present in the
American forum to fulfill jurisdictional requirements. For decades,
however, defendants have routinely defeated foreign plaintiffs with the
help of forum non conveniens, a principle of federal law that has also
won adherence in most of the state judicial systems.' 7 A definition of
the term appears in the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure
Act: "[w]hen the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the
action should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss
the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just. ' '1°
Because of its dependence on adjectives rather than strict criteria, forum
non conveniens provides judges with an option, not strict orders to
decline jurisdiction. It is formally available in Alien Tort litigation, but
102. See Rachael E. Schwartz, "And Tomorrow?" The Torture Victim Protection Act, 11 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 271, 283 (1994); see also Jennifer Correale, The Torture Victim Protection Act: A
Vital Contribution to International Human Rights Enforcement or Just a Nice Gesture?, 6 PACE INT'L
L. REV. 197, 208 (1994) (stating that the statute "is intended to ensure that alien victims of official
torture do not encounter Tel-Oren type obstacles when bringing suit in a U.S. court.").
103. See H.R..REP. No. 102-367, at 4 (1994) reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N 84, 86 (noting these
purposes of the statute).
104. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
105. Id. at 105.
106. Id. at 106.
107. See David I. Becker, A Call for the Codification of the Unocal Doctrine, 32 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 183, 195 (1998). Some judges use a related consideration, "comity," which instructs courts to
decline to exercise jurisdiction "in deference to the laws and interests of another foreign country."
Garvey, supra note 27, at 31.
108. See Becker, supra note 107, at 195-96 (quoting Uniform Interstate and International
Procedure Act, 13 U.L.A. § 105 (1986)).
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arises much more often in cases alleging violations of municipal law;1°9 in
municipal-law litigation, judges generally find the option attractive.
Forum non conveniens has amounted to a shoal in the path of foreign
plaintiffs; most founder on it.11°
Some judges, however, prefer to keep cases that they could dismiss.
The colorful set of judicial opinions in Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro
Alfaro"' airs a discussion among judges of the Texas Supreme Court
about forum non conveniens. Over spirited dissents, this court rejected
the doctrine and provided a forum for workers of the Standard Fruit
Company in Costa Rica who alleged that exposure to a pesticide called
dibromochlorpropane had made them sterile. The case was later settled
on terms that observers deemed favorable to the plaintiffs;"' perhaps
more important to their supporters, the precedent went on to aid
thousands of other banana workers, who went on to file claims in the
Texas and Louisiana courts during the mid-1990s, winning
settlements.! 3  A more recent precedent curbs the freedom of trial
judges to avail themselves of forum non conveniens: in the litigation
against Texaco for environmental damage in Ecuador, Judge Jed
Rakoff, who had inherited the case upon the death of another judge,
dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds. Reversing, the
Second Circuit directed Judge Rakoff to take note of political
developments in Ecuador that made its judiciary less suited to hear the
litigation, as well as relevant decisions that Texaco made within the
United States." 4
Occasional judicial inclinations to keep cases that could be
dismissed notwithstanding, it appears fair to conclude that forum non
conveniens has been and will remain a serious obstacle for plaintiffs who
seek redress in the United States for offshore harms. Its flexibility,
however, should foster optimism among proponents of offshore-harms
litigation. Because forum non conveniens does not force judges to
dismiss actions, it can recede as an obstacle when judges are inclined-or
educated-to keep offshore-harms cases in their courts.
109. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Book Review: Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act,
76 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1576 (1998).
110. See Becker, supra note 107, at 197 (noting various explanations for defendants successful
invocations of forum non conveniens, including the principle of lex loci delictus, which means that the
court would have to apply the law of the place where the plaintiff was injured, and Supreme Court
precedent opposing difference to the plaintiffs choice of forum when the plaintiff is not a U.S.
citizen).
111. 786 S.W. 2d 674 (Tex. 1990).
112. See Cleveland, supra note 108, at 1555.
113. See id. Slamming the courthouse door on foreign plaintiffs, the Texas Legislature, reacting
to Castro Alfaro, installed forum non conveniens into state law. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 71.051 (1993).
114. See Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998).
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III. GROUND HELD IN COMMON BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW AND ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
International human rights law and enterprise liability hold ground
in common in two senses of the phrase. First, they share some common
purposes. Second, they differ from each other in ways that suggest
expansion, extension, and reinforcement of the two domains. This Part
discusses both their shared terrain and areas of potential mutual
influence toward expansion.
A. Honest Bookkeeping
Both enterprise liability and international law generally, not only
human rights law, seek to break down false barriers that instruct an
honest understanding of the reach of harm. Even the conservative
vision of the Alien Tort statute, expressed by Judge Bork expressed in
Tel-Oren and Joseph Sweeney in his much-cited article, agree that the
statute's purpose is to right some kind of wrong, or fill some kind of gap.
International law seeks to solve the problems of its day, and the
concerns identified in this Essay have brought tort-like problems to the
forefront.'15 Customary international law, the center of the Alien Tort
statute, can be seen as just one of many international law devices to
achieve honest bookkeeping.
116
For its part, enterprise liability emphasizes the related concept of
cost internalization. Proponents of enterprise liability do not necessarily
endorse an expansive vision of cost; some academics have favored
limiting this type of liability to certain kinds of damages, while others
would eliminate certain activities from the enterprise liability
expansion."7 Nevertheless, the concept focuses on accuracy: enterprises
need to be made aware of the full cost that their activities generate.
Proponents of enterprise liability seek to gather together the harmful
consequences of business activities and return them to the enterprise,
rather than leave them where they fell on injured persons."' The
115. See ANTHONY D'AMATO, The Domain of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANTHOLOGY 3 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994) ("A hundred years ago, the topics of belligerency,
neutrality, and state acquisition of territory loomed much larger than they do today. On the other
hand, a hundred years ago you could find very little in the international law literature on human
rights and practically nothing on the global environment.").
116. For example, the Restatement of Foreign Relations identifies extraterritorial jurisdiction
based on United States statutes on a variety of bases, including the effects principle, where actions
that have effects within the U.S. borders may be subject to redress in American courts. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 cmt. d (1987).
117. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
118. Oliver Wendell Holmes was perhaps the first tort theorist who wrote about the way in
which tort law resembles a "state-compelled mutual insurance society" where individuals could await
recompense for injuries in advance, having prepaid into a distribution system. NOLAN & URSIN,
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central point here is that hurt persons are not to be saddled with (all of)
their losses, despite the tendency of tort and contract rules framed in the
nineteenth century to impose this responsibility on hurt persons rather
than enterprises.
National boundaries have protected enterprises from responsibility
that would otherwise have been imposed under the law of enterprise
liability, in a manner that respects no central tenet or logic of the
concept. The fortuity of a plaintiff's geographical location plays a
central part in other areas of doctrine, such as the law of civil procedure,
but not in enterprise liability, whose boundary is the reach or scope of
the entrepreneurial activity in question. Like the notice provision of the
Sales Act that Justice Traynor obliterated from consumer litigation in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,"' the border around the
nation-state does not delineate anything meaningful to the endeavor of
measuring the real costs of entrepreneurial activity. Similarly, persons
injured by manufactured products or careless motorists during the first
half of the twentieth century may have been kept out of court by
prevailing interpretations of privity or negligence, but enterprise liability
theorists refused to regard those doctrinal boundaries as inviolate; they
focused on injuries rather than the legal bases to dismiss hurt persons
from view.
Brought to influence enterprise liability, international human rights
law-in its contemporary form that reaches through the barriers of
nation-state boundaries-facilitates accurate assessment of costs. 20
Without the procedural and adjudicative advantages that modern
international human rights law gives individual claimants, business
enterprises that conduct risky operations offshore receive inaccurate
information about the costs of their doing business. We have seen that
forum non conveniens keeps foreign plaintiffs out of American courts
when they allege only violations of municipal law."' International
human rights law, less vulnerable to this doctrinal defense, provides a
way around the barrier and thereby carries necessary factual
information to the injurious enterprise.
supra note 11, at 16-17. Although he disapproved of equating tort liability with insurance, Holmes
nevertheless recognized that adjudication of accident claims against entrepreneurial defendants
necessarily creates a compensation system that imposes an insurance-like blend of benefits and
burdens on the public. Unlike defendants of the pre-industrial common law, business enterprises
(starting with the great paradigmatic railroad companies) pass along their costs of tort liability to
others.
119. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 899 (Cal. 1963).
120. Cf Lisa T. Belenky, Cradle to Border: U.S. Hazardous Waste Export Regulations and
International Law, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 95, 136 (1999) (noting that the United States "has the
technology, the capital, and the capacity to treat, store, and dispose of all of its own hazardous waste.
While it may be cheaper in the short run for domestic generators to export hazardous waste, the cost
savings is really an externality .... ).
121. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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B. Expanding Conceptions of Harm
The theme of honest bookkeeping goes deeper when both
enterprise liability and international human rights law delve into the
dynamic concept of harm. Whereas national and doctrinal boundaries
keep some real harms from the books, thereby defeating honest
bookkeeping, other harms get omitted because the doctrines cannot see
them: each has an incomplete understanding of the nature of injury.
In the hands of economic analysts, enterprise liability has become
bloodless. The mechanics of cost internalization and risk shifting have
taken attention away from injury; aggregation of personal and
environmental injuries makes them more actuarial than real.' z
Conjoining international human rights law with enterprise liability for
accidents would bring to the forefront a concern with pain and injustice.
In a complementary way, conjoining enterprising liability with
international human rights law accommodates the deficiencies of an
excessive emphasis on ogres, holocausts, slavery, torture, and similar
deviations. Monstrousness is not a necessary element of wrongdoing.
Because "fault," not intent to hurt and not strict liability, is at the center
of common law responsibility for injury, tort law regards intent and
negligence as comparable: the notion of fault imposes the same
compensatory responsibility for, say, using a blade to cut a person's
finger out of hatred and using a blade to cut a person's finger by
accident (an accident, that is, that could have been avoided if the
defendant had exercised "reasonable care" or "ordinary prudence"),
when damages are the same for both injuries. International human
rights violations, by contrast, have connoted Nuremberg, the Geneva
Convention, the killing fields of Vietnam and Cambodia, land mines on
several continents, or torture and genocide. I do not deny the difference
between accidentally inflicted injury on the one hand and intentional
injury on the other. Neither, for that matter, does tort law deny the
123difference. Instead I raise a question: does the rubric of "fault," which
emphasizes what accidents have in common with intentional wrongs,
have a place in the adjudication of international human rights claims?
The great innovation of modern tort law was to find
blameworthiness in a subset of unintended consequences that stem from
entrepreneurial activity. Those writers who denounce the "subsidy"
inherent in fault-based tort law in the nineteenth century-a shift that, by
moving away from strict liability, burdened injured people and enriched
122. Gregory Keating makes a related point when he faults theoreticians of accident law for
focusing on risk rather than harm. See Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of
Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1328-31 (1997).
123. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881) (pointing out that a dog
knows the difference between being tripped over and being kicked).
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usness14 -neglect a complimentary development whereby injured
people began to ascribe fault to an enterprise. Tort doctrine had to
change in the nineteenth century when a significant fraction of the
population began regularly to encounter engine-powered railroad cars,
dangerous factory machinery, devices like scaffolds and cranes used
routinely rather than to build one lone town church and, later, mass-
marketed products."' Technological innovation, thus, built plaintiffs
and potential plaintiffs. It also built a new kind of defendant, one who
could be deemed blameworthy in a negative sense of waste or foregone
opportunity to take precautions, rather than in terms of a blameworthy
soul or mental state, which requires human personhood.
Contemporary tort law understands that fault does not require
animate, corporeal human existence. In this understanding of
wrongdoing, a non-human legal fiction-for instance, an entity that calls
itself "Texaco" or "Freeport-McMoran"-can violate the law of
international human rights. Accidents that threaten lives, environments,
and indigenous cultures evoke both enterprise liability and international• 126
human rights law.
C. Methods, Parties, Procedures
The conjunction of enterprise liability for accidents with
international human rights law brings the vexing, yet pertinent, common
law to bear on human rights questions. Once it is recognized that the
law of nations can be violated without intent to inflict grievous harm on
a person, an entire corpus of American law-now spread among products
liability, toxic torts, environmental law, and other areas-becomes
relevant to human rights litigation as it seeks to explore the parameters
of this liability.
To be sure, several commentators would reject this contribution to
international law. Inasmuch as scholars like Maxwell Chibundi, Curtis
Bradley, and Jack Goldsmith have argued that customary international
law does not belong in American courts, they would likely find the
common law as expressed in enterprise liability case law an even more
alien version of the same unfortunate contaminant. One can readily
accept a portion of this concern about forcing business enterprises to
follow an unwritten, vaguely formulated conception of customary
international law in their offshore activities, at the risk of being hauled
124. See MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 63-
108 (1977); Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 382
(1951).
125. See John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: Classical Tort
Law and the Cooperative First Party Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690, 694 (2001) ("In
the second half of the nineteenth century, the United States experienced an accident crisis like none
the world had ever seen and none any Western nation has witnessed since.").
126. See Herz, supra note 1, at 572-73, 581 and passim.
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into an American court by anyone injured anywhere. A code, or a set of
cross-border regulations, might offer business enterprises better
127guidance than the common law can provide. Maintaining this Essay's
focus on prediction rather than normative guidance, however, I would
contend that the common law of enterprise liability is familiar enough to
common-law tendencies within contemporary international human
rights law to develop congruently with it.
Having lost much of its preoccupation with states and only states as
actors, international human rights law now depends on common law like
recourse to analogy and pragmatics. State action, for instance, mutes
into shades of gray as plaintiffs seek redress against paramilitary
officials, soldiers in not-quite-national armies, and other quasi-private
128
entities. Customary international law moves very slowly through the
barriers of international consensus; with activists urging expansion and
common law development resisting change, the task of identifying new
norms and rules becomes crucial. 21 Moreover, the Alien Tort statute
bestows obligations on the federal judiciary that cannot be dodged
indefinitely with recourse to jurisdiction-denying devices.130 Judges have
had to struggle with the content of enterprise liability, and they will have
to struggle increasingly with challenges of the common law in
adjudicating international human rights claims.
The conjunction of enterprise liability for accidents with
international human rights law provides a new, juxtaposing contrast
between substance and procedure-a contrast that may prove instructive
to specialists in both fields. It might bear mention that not all of the
common law treatment of accident claims has enriched plaintiffs. Many
of them lose, despite the liberalization of their access to court.
International human rights law, in a contrasting tradition, starts with the
premise that the claims are good but the procedural barriers -act of state
doctrine, foreign sovereign immunity, standing, limited extraterritorial
application and so forth-are insurmountable. Common law enterprise
liability presents the reverse phenomenon: barriers melt away, but
plaintiffs often lose on the merits. Conjoining the two brings to
international human rights law the problem of what to do with a claim
that is bad on the merits, a question that looms on its horizon. For
enterprise liability practitioners and scholars, the even more looming
trend toward keeping plaintiffs out of courts raises the specter of
procedural difficulty. In each of these subjects, experts combine
127. See Garvey, supra note 20.
128. See generally Moore, supra note 88.
129. See Beth Stephens, Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM
L. REV. 393,458-58 (1997).
130. See id.; see also Michael C. Small, Note, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in
Federal Courts: The Alien Tort Statute and Separation of Powers, 74 GEO. L.J. 163, 166 (1985).
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familiarity with one and unfamiliarity with the other; when working
together on international human rights claims for accidental harm-the
point of conjunction-these professionals can each share with the other a
crucial perspective.
The two subjects also share an ambiguous relation with the state.
Like the vanquishing of Tel-Oren by the progeny of Filartiga, the
outcome of this struggle seems close to certain. Strife in what had been
Yugoslavia during the early 1990s bequeathed to international law a
permanent critique of its positivist, state-focused perspective. Anthony
D'Amato's claim in 1988 that international human rights law had
reversed direction away from its Oppenheim/Bentham positivism has
proved prescient. With the nation-state no longer so pivotal in this area
of international law, contemporary institutions will have to fill the void.
Enterprise liability is well qualified to contribute to the newer regime of
international law that extends beyond the state. Its founders wrote and
taught with a similar sense of the missing national government: theorists
like Fleming James recognized the state would not deliver a full
measure of social insurance, and so they set out to build doctrines that
could work collaboratively with governments on programs like no-fault
automobile insurance and workmen's compensation. If, after
Yugoslavia, international human rights law will always combine public
wrongs with private rights and remedies, then the experiences of
enterprise liability become relevant.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE CONJUNCTION
As we have seen, the conjunction of enterprise liability with
international human rights law requires numerous players -including,
but not limited to, judges, litigators, and legislators. Forum non
conveniens, for instance, is, to a large extent, a permissive doctrine: as a
general matter, judges who want to keep a case in their courts can do so,
while rejectionist judges have a basis for dismissal."' Litigators decide
whether to file offshore-harms claims in United States courts.
132
Legislators can enact, or decline to enact, statutory invitations and
deterrents to litigation on behalf of offshore plaintiffs."' These events
suggest that when key players choose to "think globally," as the phrase
goes, they work to effect the conjunction that is under study here.
Scholars report a phenomenon of growing internationalization in
131. See supra Part II.B.2. For a negative statement of this point, see Patrick M. McFadden, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 4, 5 (1995) ("Because international law is law... judges might be expected to lead
the fight to apply it. Instead, they appear to have led the retreat.").
132. See generally Herz, supra note 1.
133. See supra notes 101-103, 113 and accompanying text (noting the passage of the TVPA and
the adoption of forum non conveniens by the Texas legislature).
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134American legal education. At one level, the phenomenon is not new:
for instance, one hundred years ago law schools were more likely than
they are today to have required a course in international law.' By most
indicators, however, international law and related subjects have lately
been burgeoning in American legal education.13 6  Two studies done by
the American Bar Association, one in 1963-1964 and a follow-up in
1996, demonstrate an exponential rate of growth in the number and
variety of international law course offerings in the span of aS• 137
generation. Because these courses are elective, some educators are
now seeking to go further by requiring international- and comparative-
law enrichments in the first-year curriculum, a notion under
consideration at Harvard and N.Y.U.138  "Sure it's trendy,"
acknowledged NYU law professor Norman Dorsen in response to a
reporter's question. "But it's also real. It's like clinical programs years
ago. A few law schools got into them, and they took hold."'
3
In this respect, law schools have lagged behind business schools,
which have been favoring a strong international approach to the
curriculum since at least the early 1990s. 140  In October 1998, Business
Week featured six prominent schools on its cover; according to
journalist Aric Press, four of the six-Wharton, Michigan, Harvard, and
Columbia-have required courses in international business, while the
other two, Kellogg and Chicago, are known for emphasizing
international studies. 141 Business practice as well as business education
bespeaks the trend: in 1999 a journalist who covers banking began an
article by noting a recent change: "[m]entioning international mutual
funds to a bank brokerage customer just five years ago was a risky
proposition. Older customers were not inclined to think globally .... ,142
134. See John B. Altanasio, The Globalization of the American Law School, 46 J-LEGAL EDUC.
311 (1996); Alberto Bernabe-Rieflkohl, Tomorrow's Law Schools: Globalization and Legal
Education, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137 (1995). Professor John Barrett has reported on the
phenomenon extensively both in his law-review writings and in his work as a consultant for the
American Bar Association. See Barrett, Plenty of Offerings, supra note 70, Barnett, supra note 7.
135. See McFadden, supra note 131, at 65.
136. A journalist reports:
Columbia [Law School] is busily trying to remind everyone of its longtime commitment to
international studies. And, in the process, trying to catch up in the 212 area code with New
York University's new programs and bold declaration that it is now the global law school.
Stanford has its famous SLIPS program; Georgetown is a permanent State Department-in-
waiting. Wisconsin-Madison offers a world-class program in East Asian studies; Pitt's law
school suggests that its students take a foreign language. More than 100 law schools offer
summer programs abroad. You get the idea.
Aric Press, We're All Connected, AM. LAWYER, Nov. 1998, at 5.
137. Barnett, Plenty of Offerings, supra note 70, at 847, 859-867.
138. See Press, supra note 136.
139. Id.
140. See Alan Rugman, Internationalization of the Curriculum, 21 J. Bus. ADMIN. 13, 15 (1992)
(adverting to the disagreement among business educators over whether internationalization should
be addressed in a separate course sequence, or mainstreamed into the central M.B.A. program).
141. See Press, supra note 136.
142. Michael O'D. Moore, Breaking Down Resistance to Global Funds, AM. BANKER, June 2,
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As for practicing lawyers, they increasingly identify international
law as central to the practice of virtually anyone who serves as an
advocate for clients, especially business clients. The National
Association for Law Placement began publishing a resource guide for
international law careers in 1999.141 One international lawyer, who has
worked as a diplomat and a teacher of international law before moving
to a corporate law department, writes that his fellow in-house counsel
employed by American corporations should think of international legal
work as "just standard practice., 144 The American Law Institute has
teamed up with Rome-based International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law, or Unidroit, to draft procedural rules covering the
adjudication of private international disputes. 4 1
Skeptics may continue to think that there is less here than meets
the eye, and some evidence does support this view. For example, law
students continually express interest in international law to law school
admissions officers, and just as continually tend to avoid the elective
courses that are duly offered in response to that expression. Studies of
international law education in the United States, which reveal all kinds
of growth-summer-abroad programs, widespread participation in the
Jessup International Moot Court competition, post-degree graduate
programs, concentrations or certificate programs in international law,
and the like-also report that at most American law schools fewer than
20 percent of J.D. students take a course in international law, a
percentage that has remained constant for many decades. 146 The gap
between students' preliminary expressions of interest and their ultimate
enrollment in elective courses suggests that their early expressions of
interest in international law are naive or poorly thought out. In deciding
whether to exploit this naivete, law school administrators (who compete
for student enrollment) have a motive to exaggerate the extent to which
their schools emphasize international law. Moreover, all fads attract
hangers-on, suggesting that the total number of people who appear to
be part of the internationalization of American law is a number padded
by opportunism.
Yet, one cannot dismiss global legal education as entirely a fad or a
stack of press releases. In addition to all the genuine changes in legal
education that John Barrett and the ABA have reported, the pre-
enrollment personal experiences of law students also make a difference.
1999, at 8.
143. See Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, International Legal Education, 34 INT'L. L. 817, 826
(2000).
144. Frank A. Orban III, Legal Globalization: The Challenges for In-House Counsel, ACCA
DOCKET, Feb. 2001, at 48.
145. See Rolf Sturner, Some European Remarks on a New Joint of the American Law Institute
and UNIDROIT, 34 INT'L L. 1071, 1071 (2000).
146. See Barrett, Plenty of Offerings, supra note 70, at 853-55.
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Persons enrolled in law school in 2001 take for granted the Internet,
personal computers, CNN-style television coverage of remote events,
and low prices for international telephone calls and air travel to foreign
locations. Many participated in, or observed, campus demonstrations
against offshore labor abuses. Few are old enough to remember a time
before worldwide environmentalism arose in the early 1970s. Because
none of these biographical conditions applies to the incumbent
generation in control of American law at this moment-judges,
legislators, experienced litigators, and senior administrators of law
schools-it is reasonable to identify a real generational change, and, thus,
to expect globalization to have a genuine effect on the study and
practice of law. 47
Judges-who in the United States start out as lawyers and before
that were law students-stand at an end point in a sequence of
development. A pipeline leads to the creation of judges who can be
expected in future years to have internalized the phenomenon of
globalization. In the meantime, many judges whose training and
experience predate these developments are becoming educated in
international law and related subjects. New bench books have recently
been prepared for them: Patrick McFadden, a leading critic of
provincialism in American courts, 14 has written such a book, and the
Federal Judicial Center has several manuscripts in press or newly
published as of this writing. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor of the
Supreme Court, who is active in the American Society for International
Law, has in recent years taken on the project of international law
education for the judiciary.5
These changes, admittedly both gradual and reversible, suggest that
the future conjunction of international human rights law with enterprise
liability lies at a distant point in the future, perhaps well after the day
that claims alleging slavery and torture as violations of customary
international law are routinely heard in United States courts. One
scholar's pointed 1997 reminder-that no Alien Tort suit featuring an
international environmental law claim has ever proceeded to trial"S-still
holds true. Current developments suggest, however, that enterprise
liability and international human rights law are destined to meet,
coming together in the task of measuring the scope and magnitude of
147. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting that scholarship by law students tends to
favor liberal conceptions of jurisdiction, whereas senior scholars are more likely to oppose this
liberality). Of course, it is possible that scholars simply grow less receptive to liberal jurisdiction as
they grow older and wiser. But this large block of student writing is fairly recent; earlier generations
of international law scholars did not memorialize a transient phase with publications like these.
148. See McFadden, supra note 131.
149. See Zahralddin-Aravena, supra note 143, at 827.
150. See id.
151. See Bederman, supra note 100, at 156.
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harms that extend beyond national frontiers.
